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Abstract 
This study develops a model for wildlife migrating seasonally between a conservation area 
and a neighbouring area. When being outside the conservation area, harvesting takes place by 
a group of small-scale farmers. The local people have two motives for harvesting; to get rid of 
‘problem’ animals as roaming wildlife destroys crops and agricultural products, and hunting 
for meat and trophies. Depending on the specification of the property rights, the harvesting is 
legal or illegal. It is demonstrated that it is far from clear which of the two property rights 
regimes that gives the highest wildlife abundance. Hence, contrary to what is argued for in the 
literature, handing the property rights over to the local people means not automatically more 
wildlife and a more ‘sustainable’ resource utilization. The reason lies in the nuisance motive 
for harvesting. The exploitation under the two different property rights regimes are illustrated 
by numerical calculations with data that fits reasonable well with the exploitation of the 
wildebeest population in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. 
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1. Introduction 
For a long time it has been recognised that institutions play an important role in natural 
resource management, and that the specification and function of property rights to a large 
extent determine whether resources can be utilized in a sustainable way. These dimensions 
will be at the focus in the present study when analysing the management and exploitation of 
wildlife in a sub-Saharan Africa context with example from the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. 
When considering natural resources in the form of wildlife in this region, as in other regions 
in the sub-Saharan Africa, central issues are the behaviour of the local people living close to 
the wildlife, and the interaction between the local people, the wildlife and the agency 
managing and having the legal property rights of the wildlife. Often this interaction represents 
conflicting interests; both the legal owner of the wildlife (usually the State, or large private 
landowners) and the rural people claim their rights to reap the benefits of the huge amount of 
wildlife resources. In addition, the costs of having abundant wildlife populations differ 
between them. These conflicts, rooted in the prevailing property structure and its functioning, 
have serious implications for the resource exploitation and, thus, on the management of the 
wildlife in general (Marks 1984, Kiss 1990, Swanson and Barbier 1992, Naughton-Treves and 
Sanderson 1995, Sinclair and Arcese 1995, Skonhoft and Solstad 1998, Bulte and van Kooten 
1999). 
 
The common perception in the literature is that local communities will support wildlife 
conservation and reduce the wildlife offtake if they are ensured a sufficient share of the 
benefits from wildlife (see Kiss 1990, Swanson and Barbier 1992, Mangel et al. 1996). Under 
what conditions a community based management system results in a higher wildlife 
abundance and more conservation than the polar scheme where the local people have no legal 
rights to wildlife exploitation, is analysed in the present paper. The starting point is that we 
have a protected area, a national park or a conservation area of fixed size, with no harvesting 
of the wildlife. The protected area is the basic living area of the species, but the animals roam 
freely in and out of the park. When being outside, the game destroys the crops of the farmers 
living in the vicinity of the park and hence, the wildlife represents a nuisance for the local 
people. The park agency has the property rights of the wildlife within as well as outside the 
protected area, but illegal harvesting takes place outside as the property rights is not 
effectively protected here. This is the first regime where the local people have no property 
rights1. In the next step, the property rights are handed over to the local people and hence, the 
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exploitation of the wildlife outside the protected area takes place in a legal manner2. The 
different degree of wildlife utilization is compared under these two regimes, and contrary to 
what is argued for in the literature the first property rights scheme may result in the highest 
wildlife abundance. Analysing the driving forces behind such an outcome is the main 
contribution of this paper.  
 
The hunting activity and the utilization of the wildlife under these two regimes are 
exemplified by the migration of wildebeest in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. The migration 
pattern here, which is seasonal and related to rainfall and food supply, is also used as a 
motivation for the ecological part of the model. Parts of the year the migratory wildebeest 
population is staying within the huge Serengeti national park and it is assumed that no human 
extraction takes place here3. However, when being outside there is hunting. The conceptual 
framework for analysing the exploitation of a terrestrial animal population when there is 
migration, and hunting is a seasonal activity, is another contribution of the paper. 
 
To simplify the following analysis we consider only two areas; the protected area and the 
whole boundary region collapsed into one boundary area. The protected area is the basic 
living area of the wildlife and is owned and managed by the State. No human extraction is 
allowed here, and hence, non-consumptive benefit (tourism, existence value, etc.) is the only 
benefit of this area. However, the park manager play no role in the subsequent model as the 
management of this area is supposed to have no stock effects (no harvesting and no culling, 
but see Wright 1999). The small-scale farmers are living in the boundary area, where the 
wildlife roams during the migration season. They are involved in two production activities; 
agricultural crop production and wildlife hunting (see, e.g., Barrett and Arcese 1998). First, 
we study today’s situation where the local people have no property rights, and hence, they 
hunt illegal. This is in accordance with the ‘open-access’ model of Smith (1975). Under this 
scenario we disregard any enforcement use and consequently, the park manager is passively 
benefiting from non-consumptive utilization of wildlife in the protected area. In a next step, 
we study what happens when the property rights over the wildlife are given to the local 
people. 
 
We start by formulating the ecological model and the migration pattern in section 2. In 
section 3 the benefit function of the local people is presented, and in section 4 it is studied 
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how this translates into harvesting when they have no property rights. In this section, as later, 
it will for simplicity be assumed that only the current benefit, or current utility, is steering the 
harvesting activity. In section 5 the model is analysed when the local people have the property 
rights over the wildlife. In section 6 the two different property rights regimes are illustrated 
by numerical calculations with data that fits reasonable well to the exploitation of the 
wildebeest population in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem.  
 
2. The ecology 
As already noted, we consider a wildlife population (e.g., wildebeest) migrating over the year 
in a well defined way, and where harvesting only takes place when the wildlife are outside 
their core area, i.e., the conservation area or the national park. Because the seasonal migration 
is related to rainfall and food supply, there is no density-dependent factors influencing the 
wildlife flow. For simplicity it is assumed that the whole wildlife population is leaving the 
core area, and we separate sharply between the periods of the year when the wildlife is 
roaming outside and when the animals are staying inside of the protected area. These two 
periods are synonymous with the ‘fishery season’ and ‘between season’ in Homans and Wilen 
(1997)4. We start by formulating the hunting season dynamics while the between season 
dynamics and the steady state follow next. 
 
Migration and harvesting 
As mentioned above, harvesting takes place only during the period of migration, i.e., when 
the wildlife is roaming outside the conservation area. Further, we do not separate between 
different hunting strategies within the harvesting period. This is in line with Homans and 
Wilen’s fishery model (1997), where harvesting effort is utilized at a constant rate throughout 
the period when harvesting takes place. For a critical assessment of this assumption, see Getz 
and Haight (1989). The wildlife harvesting function is specified as a Schaefer function giving 
the harvest at time t as  
 
(1) )t(qaX)t(h = ,  
 
where X(t) is the wildlife stock (measured as biomass), while a ≥ 0 is the harvesting effort 
considered variable between the seasons, but fixed within a season of migration. q is a 
parameter, the so-called catchability coefficient. 
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When being within the conservation area the wildlife grows in a density-dependent fashion 
(see below), and when being outside natural mortality is ignored5. Outside the conservation 
area the stock therefore shrinks according to )t(qaXdt/)t(dX −= . The stock level outside 
the conservation area at time t is accordingly 
 
(2) qat0eX)t(X
−=   
 
where 0X  is the stock level when the species starts roaming outside the protected area.  
 
The length of the migration period, i.e., the time when being outside the conservation area, is 
fixed as T. Hence, the stock level when the wildlife is returning back to the park is 
 
(3) sXeXX 0
qaT
0T == −   
 
where aT  is the total hunting effort in the migration period, and 1es0 qaT ≤=< − is 
accordingly the survival rate of the species when being outside the conservation area. Under 
these assumptions, total amount of wildlife harvested is 
 
(4) )s1(XXXH 0T0 −=−= .  
 
Natural growth and ecological equilibrium 
So far we have studied a single period migration, where the stock size 0X  at the beginning of 
the period of migration is predetermined. However, as the number of animals harvested 
depends on the initial stock, the harvest changes when 0X  changes. The factors affecting the 
initial stock size are found by analysing the dynamics between the seasons of migration. We 
assume that the conservation area is the basic living area where calving takes place, meaning 
that the stock size returning back determines the natural growth. When t,TX  is the stock 
returning back to the conservation area at time t, the density-dependent growth is accordingly 
determined as )X(F t,T . We represent natural growth by a logistic function with K as the 
carrying capacity and r as the maximum specific growth rate, where both parameters are 
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treated as fixed6. Hence, we ignore any possible feedback from consumption of agricultural 
crops on the natural growth. This seems reasonable when assuming that the fraction of fodder 
eaten from agricultural crops is low or, in shortage of crops, the consumption may switch to 
wild dry fodder. See also section 3.  
 
If 1t,0X +  is the stock level at the beginning of the next period of migration, then the dynamics 
between the migration seasons is given by  
 
(5) )K/X1(rXX)X(FXX t,Tt,Tt,Tt,Tt,T1t,0 −+=+=+ . 
 
Equation (5) together with the balance equation (4) written as 1t,T1t,01t XXH +++ −= , yields 
)X(FXXH t,Tt,T1t,T1t +=+ ++ . Ecological equilibrium is defined by a constant wildlife stock 
returning back to the park area, T1t,Tt,T XXX == + 7. In steady-state, natural growth, taking 
place within the conservation area, is therefore equal to harvesting, taking place in the 
surrounding area, H)X(F T = . When substituting for the logistic growth function and 
equation (3) and using (4), we obtain )s1(X)K/sX1(srX 000 −=− . Consequently, the 
ecological equilibrium is given by 0X 0 =  and 
 
(6) )s/1r1)(rs/K(X 0 −+=  
 
with (1 1/ ) 0r s+ − > . From this equation it follows that the equilibrium stock returning back 
to the conservation area is equal to )s/1r1)(r/K(X T −+= . Because more harvesting 
effort reduces the survival rate s, more effort also clearly reduces the stock size, 0a/X T <∂∂ . 
From the equilibrium condition )X(FXX TT0 += , we also have 0a/X 0 <∂∂ as long as 
'F1 <− . When evaluating 'F at the equilibrium, or differentiating equation (6) directly, this 
condition also writes [ ] 0)r1(s/2 >+− . In what follows, this is assumed to hold.  
 
3. Agricultural production, crop damage, and harvesting 
Above we established the ecological steady-state for a fixed amount of hunting effort. 
However, the hunting activity is determined by economic considerations and now these 
motives are outlined. Throughout we will think of the local people as a homogeneous group 
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of small-scale farmers living in the boundary area of the park8. They are involved in two 
different production activities; agricultural production and wildlife hunting. In the model, as 
in reality, there are two basic motives behind hunting. In addition to the already mentioned 
nuisance motive where hunting takes place to get rid of ‘problem’ animals destroying crops 
and agricultural products, there is also hunting for meat or, occasionally, for trophies (Marks 
1984, Barrett and Arcese 1998). Because of small funds and large areas, the harvesting, when 
being illegal, takes place in an environment lacking any enforcement use. 
 
We first look at the nuisance motive working through the agricultural yield function. The 
maximum agricultural yield, i.e., the yield without damage, depends on the amount of 
agricultural land, pesticides and fertiliser use, rainfall, etc., and effort use. Keeping all factors 
fixed except of effort, the yield function reads  
 
(7) ( )A A N=   
 
where N is the total (cumulative) labour input in agricultural production over the year 
(seeding, harvesting and maintaining the crop). A is an increasing function of N with 
0)0(A = , but at a decreasing rate, so that 0)N('A >  and 0)N(''A ≤  hold.  
 
More wildlife means more nuisance, and following Zivin et al. (2000) we assume that the 
damage is proportional to the amount of wildlife. It is assumed that wildlife consumes a 
fraction β of its body weight in forage dry matter per day. As mentioned above, while grazing 
in the outer area, the wildlife consumes both agricultural crops and other dry matter. In the 
following, the fraction eaten from crops is denoted γ. The nuisance stream at time t is 
therefore )t(Xγβ  with 0 1β< <  and 0 1γ≤ ≤  as fixed constants9. Consequently, the 
cumulative damage of the wildlife roaming outside the conservation area is  
 
(8)  qa/)s1(XD 0 −= γβ   
 
when using equation (2) and integrating. If AP  is the crop price, assumed to be fixed, and 
leaving out fertiliser and pesticides costs, etc., the net crop benefit is 
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(9) [ ]D)N(APB A −= , 
 
with D defined in the interval [ ])N(A,0  as the damage can never exceed the yield. The 
nuisance motive for harvesting is therefore working through D. More harvesting reduces the 
damage for a given stock size as the total amount of harvested animals increases.  
 
In addition to the nuisance motive, we have the direct benefit of hunting in the form of meat 
(and trophies). The hunting benefit is given as  
 
(10) )s1(XPHPV 0HH −==  
    
where HP  is the marginal valuation, or price, of the offtake, also assumed to be fixed.  
 
There will be a constraint on effort used in hunting and crop growing. As a is hunting effort 
per unit of time and T is the length of the migration and hunting season, this resource 
constraint reads 
 
(11) NaTL +≥ . 
 
L is the total available time per year, which also can be interpreted as the total human 
population living in the vicinity of the conservation area. Throughout the analysis L is fixed, 
meaning that we are ignoring any, if possible, Malthusian mechanism. Moreover, all the time 
the constraint is assumed to be binding, and hence, there is always a positive opportunity cost 
of labour use. 
 
When using the resource constraint, we obtain the total current benefit of the local people as 
 
(12) 0 0(1 ) [ ( ) (1 ) / ]H AU P X s P A L aT X s qaγβ= − + − − − . 
 
In the next section, we determine the optimal harvesting effort and wildlife population when 
the local people have no property rights to the wildlife roaming in the outer area.  In section 5, 
we study the polar case when they are given full property rights.   
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4. No property rights of the local people 
Assuming that the local people have no property rights corresponds, as already mentioned, to 
the stylised facts situation in sub-Saharan Africa today, and may be understood as a regime 
where the local people face a continuous risk of being effectively excluded from hunting in 
the future, e.g. due to more extensive use of law-enforcement effort. They are therefore not 
able to control the wildlife stock, and have few, if any, incentives to base their harvesting on 
long-term considerations. Technically, the absence of long-term considerations means that 
they do not take the stock of wildlife into account when deciding their effort use, and the 
number of animals entering the boundary area is consequently treated as an exogenous 
variable. As already mentioned, this corresponds to what Smith (1975) calls an ‘open-access’ 
solution. See also Skonhoft and Solstad (1998). 
 
Maximizing the benefit function (12) with respect to the control a, when keeping 0X  
exogeneous, yields the first order condition 
 
 (13)    qTsXPa/CXPT)N('AP 0H0AA =− γβ     
 
when we have an interior solution so that effort is allocated to both production activities. C 
collects terms, and reads [ ] 0s)qaT1(1)qa/1(C >+−= 10. The optimal hunting effort is 
therefore determined by the equality between the marginal benefit in agricultural production, 
corrected for damage of the roaming wildlife, and the marginal hunting benefit. This 
economic equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 where the marginal net benefit from 
agricultural production MBA is measured along the left hand vertical axis, while the marginal 
hunting benefit MBH is measured along the right hand axis. The second term on the left hand 
side of condition (13) reflects the nuisance motive caused by crop damage. Crop damage 
reduces the marginal profitability in agricultural production, and consequently, the local 
people channel more effort to hunting compared to a situation when crop damage is absent 
and 0=γ . This is illustrated by the downward shift in the marginal net agricultural benefit 
curve in the figure. 
 
 Figure 1 about here 
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The economic equilibrium condition (13) together with the ecological equilibrium condition 
(6) defines the equilibrium values of hunting effort ∞a  and the initial stock size ∞0X  
(superscript ‘∞’ denotes no property rights of the local people). In a next step, the equilibrium 
wildlife population returning back to the park area at the end of the season ∞TX  is found by 
using equation (3). When taking the total differential of these equations, the economic and 
ecological forces at work can be demonstrated (for details, see Appendix 1). The results are 
reported in Table 1. As already indicated, a higher nuisance effect reduces the marginal 
productivity of agricultural production and, hence, the local people increase their harvesting 
effort, 0/a >∂∂ ∞ γ . Consequently, the initial stock ∞0X  decreases, and this will also be so 
for ∞TX . A higher price of game meat will also motivate for more hunting effort, 
0P/a H >∂∂ ∞ , and hence, ∞TX  as well as ∞0X  decrease. A higher crop price causes the local 
people to divert more effort towards agriculture and the stock will increase, 00 >∂∂ ∞ AP/X . 
This result is in line with the analysis in Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), who find that better 
economic conditions in the agricultural sector always works in the direction of more wildlife 
conservation when the land use, as here, is fixed.  
 
 Table 1 about here 
 
The effect of a higher T is ambiguous. First, a longer migration period reduces the 
productivity of hunting as an instrument of damage control. This causes the local people to 
channel more effort towards agricultural production. Second, the marginal product of hunting 
for meat increases with the period of migration, leading the local people to increase their 
hunting effort. Consequently, if the costs of living with wildlife exceed the benefit, then more 
effort is directed to agriculture. However, the effect on total hunting effort (aT) and wildlife 
conservation is unclear. For other results, see Table 1.  
 
5. Property rights to the local people 
Above the harvesting activity and stock sizes were found when the local people had no 
property rights and hence, the harvesting activity was not based on long-term considerations. 
Now we proceed to study what happens in the polar case when the property rights are handed 
over to the local people and they do no longer harvest illegally, and hence, we have a 
community based management scheme. When not facing any risk of being effectively 
excluded from hunting in the future, they will invest in wildlife and therefore take the wildlife 
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abundance into account when allocating effort among the two production activities. 
Technically, the wildlife stock 0X  is now an endogenous variable, and the problem is 
therefore to maximize (12) with respect to a, subject to the ecological constraint (6)11.  
 
The first order condition for this problem is  
 
(14)  
[ ] [ ] qTsXPqars/)r1(s/2K)s1(qTqaPP
a/CXPT)N('AP
0HHA
0AA
=+−−−−
−
γβ
γβ
           
 
when still assuming an interior solution. This equation together with equation (6) determines 
the equilibrium effort *a and equilibrium stock size *0X , while
*
TX  again follows from 
equation (3) (superscript ‘*’ denotes the property rights case). The difference compared to the 
economic equilibrium condition (13) in the case of no local property rights, is the third term 
on the left hand side. [ ])r1(s/2 +−  is here positive because 0a/X 0 <∂∂  holds (see section 
2). The new term, depending on the sign of [ ]qaPP HA −γβ , can therefore be either positive or 
negative, and hence, *a  can be below as well as above that of ∞a . Consequently, *0X  can 
also be above or below that of ∞0X .  
 
The general conclusion following the model is therefore that it is unclear whether handing the 
property rights over to the local people will result in a higher wildlife abundance and a more 
‘sustainable’ resource utilization. On the one hand, having the property rights and taking the 
size of the wildlife into account when determining hunting effort, work in the direction of a 
higher stock size. However, at the same time, crop damage related to the size of the wildlife 
will also be taken into account, and this works in the other direction. The actual outcome 
depends critically on whether the marginal nuisance of the wildlife stock dominates the 
marginal harvesting benefit; that is, the sign of the term [ ]qaPP HA −γβ  above. If 
γβAH PqaP >  holds we therefore obtain the standard result from the literature saying that the 
presence of property rights means less harvesting effort and more wildlife conservation 
compared to the no property rights case; that is, ∞< aa* and ∞> 0*0 XX . On the other hand, 
when the marginal nuisance dominates the marginal harvesting productivity, the nuisance 
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case, we obtain ∞> aa* . Hence, taking the nuisance into account yields less wildlife than not 
doing so, ∞< 0*0 XX . 
 
The comparative static results are now found by taking the total differential of equations (14) 
and (6) (for details, see again Appendix 1).  More nuisance increases the agricultural damage 
and, hence, reduces the marginal benefit from crop production. This direct effect is the same 
as in the no property rights case, and increases the equilibrium hunting effort. In addition 
there is now an indirect effect working through the stock size at the beginning of the next 
hunting season, which reinforces the direct effect. γ∂∂ /a*  is therefore stronger when it is 
local property rights.  The direct effect of a higher game meat price is more benefit from 
hunting. As for the no property rights regime, this motivates for increased hunting and stock 
depletion, which is the same result as in the standard harvesting model (see, e.g., Clark 1990). 
Now, however, this effect is weakened because a higher offtake reduces the crop damage and 
hence, motivates for more effort allocated to crop production because the crop damage is 
taken into account. Thus, the indirect effect is of the opposite and the sign of H
* P/a ∂∂  is 
ambiguous. In the same way, the effect of a higher agricultural price is ambiguous. These 
results contrast the no property case, but are in line with results from harvesting models with 
competing uses among different assets (see, e.g., Swallow 1990). Other results are again 
given in Table 1, and as seen, the outcomes are to a large extent ambiguous.  
 
6. Numerical illustrations  
The theoretical reasoning will now be illustrated by data that fits reasonable well with the 
exploitation of the wildebeest population in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. This ecosystem 
covers an area of some 25,000 km2 on the border of Tanzania and Kenya (Sinclair 1995). The 
Serengeti National Park is a part of it, and is wide known for the migration of its large 
herbivore populations of which the wildebeest has been most in the focus. Each year about a 
million wildebeest migrate across the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem (Murray 1995). The overall 
migratory pattern is supposed to be related to food supply, which in turn is connected to 
rainfall. The Serengeti ecosystem can be divided into two main regions; the southern short 
grasslands with low annual rainfall and the wooded northern grassland with higher rainfall 
(Fryxell 1995). The migratory wildebeest use the short grasslands in the south during the wet 
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season and the tall grassland in the north during the dry season (Sinclair 1984 and 1995, 
Fryxell 1995).  
 
 Figure 2 about here 
 
The migratory herds know no boundaries, and make extensive use not only of the gazetted 
land, but also the open areas in the districts outside the borders of Serengeti National Park (cf. 
Figure 2). During the migration they spread beyond the park into the western frontier and 
enter land settled by humans. This side of Serengeti National Park is densely populated, and 
the population is increasing (Barrett and Arcese 1998). As a consequence, there are threats to 
the species diversity and the ecosystem because the landscape is modificated and habitat land 
is converted into agricultural use (Sinclair and Arcese 1995). The detrimental effects of the 
human-wildlife interaction are, however, not only one-way. The local people and the local 
communities also bear costs from the high wildlife abundance as the large herds of migrating 
herbivores induce crop damage (Emerton and Mfunda 1999). Villagers protect their crops and 
compensate themselves by hunting; in addition they also hunt for meat (Arcese et al. 1995). 
Hunting in this region is basically illegal12. Therefore, living with wildlife is twofold; it 
represents a cost to the small-scale farmers due to crop damage while it represents a benefit 
due to illegal harvesting. 
 
The ecological model, using the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem as an illustration, is specified for 
the numerical analysis at the scale of one km2 and one year. The same scale is also used for 
the agricultural benefit as well as the hunting benefit. The closer definition of the protected 
area and the outer area is found in Appendix 2. The baseline values for prices and costs 
together with ecological data and data for crop production used in the simulations are also 
presented here. As demonstrated above, the conservation effect of giving the local people 
property rights depends critically on the costs and benefits of living with wildlife. Because of 
the unclear nuisance effects, the damage coefficient γ will be varied throughout the 
simulations where a low value of γ , as mentioned, may be interpreted as more extensive use 
of fencing or other measures taken to protect crop production from the roaming wildlife. In 
addition, because of the unclear price effect under the property rights scenario, we will also 
vary the crop price AP . The conservation effect of shifting the hunting price HP  together with 
changing ecological and productivity conditions will be studied as well.  
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Figure 3 demonstrates how the wildlife abundance varies with the crop damage coefficient γ 
under both property right schemes. More nuisance means less wildlife, and hence, the 
conservation-damage schedule slopes down under both scenarios. However, in accordance 
with the theoretical reasoning, the nuisance effect is quite more substantial under the local 
property rights regime. The figure also demonstrates that handing the property rights over to 
the local people gives more wildlife only when the crop damage is quite low. Hence, only 
when γ < 0.01 and less than 1% of the forage is eaten from the crop, local property rights 
results in higher wildlife abundance. Within this range the marginal benefit of living with 
wildlife exceeds the marginal cost, i.e., the term [ ]A HP P qaγβ −  from section five is negative. 
The figure also demonstrates that the nuisance effect is so strong that the presence of local 
property rights means a total depletion of the wildlife when more than 9 % of the forage is 
eaten from the crop. Hence, according to the model and the imposed parameter values where 
the baseline value of the damage coefficient is 12 %, γ  = 0.12 (see Appendix 2), the presence 
of local property rights would have meant an extinction of the wildlife. 
 
 Figure 3 about here 
 
Under the prevailing economic conditions, handing the property rights over to the local 
community is therefore not likely to promote wildebeest conservation in Serengeti. A better 
conservation strategy is probably to impose tighter damage control and, hence, reduce the cost 
of living with wildlife. The figure demonstrates, for instance, that a total eradication of crop 
damage from today’s level (i.e., γ  reduces from 0.12 to 0.00), increases wildlife abundance 
by somewhat above 20 % within the present property rights regime. This effect may further 
be strengthened if combined with, say, increased productivity and profitability in agricultural 
production as a higher crop price means more wildlife and conservation. This will be so 
within both regimes, and both conservation-damage schedules in Figure 3 shift up when AP  
increases. However, contrary to what is expected from the theoretical reasoning, the effect is 
stronger under the property rights regime, and, for instance, we find that the same degree of 
conservation is met for γ = 0.03 when AP  is doubled from today’s level. Shifting up the crop 
productivity works in the same manner while a higher game meat price HP  motivates for 
more hunting within both property rights schemes, and both conservation-damage schedules 
 15
in Figure 3 shift down accordingly. A positive shift in the catchability coefficient q due to, 
say, improved hunting technology, also means reduced wildlife abundance within both 
property rights schemes, and the same degree of conservation is met for a higher value of the 
damage coefficient. We have also studied the effects of shifting the migration period T, 
interpreted as taken place as a result of, say, drought. The conservation-damage schedules, 
however, are only modestly influenced. 
 
7. Discussion and concluding remarks 
There is a growing recognition that a viable and sustainable wildlife utilization in the future 
depends on the support of the local communities living close to the wildlife, and during the 
last years community based wildlife management projects have increasingly become one of 
the means for safeguarding wildlife in sub-Saharan Africa (Kiss, 1990, Swanson and Barbier 
1992). The basic idea behind these schemes is to engender the co-operation of local 
communities in wildlife conservation and wildlife management by ensuring that parts of the 
benefits from wildlife utilization go to the local communities. There are several ways in 
which benefit sharing can take place; through revenue sharing from tourism, safari hunting, or 
establishing user rights through hunting quotas (see Barrett and Arcese (1998) and Skonhoft 
1998 for some analyses), or through local job creation in tourism, wildlife and park services. 
The experiences from two prototypes of community based projects are summarised by Kiss 
(1990), namely Windfall and Campfire (both in Zimbabwe). 
 
What has been analysed in this paper is a more far-reaching community based management 
system as the local people have been given the full property rights of the wildlife; that is, they 
control and obtain the whole benefit stream from the wildlife when it is outside the protected 
area. This management scheme has been compared to the polar one of having no property 
rights. Under the scenario of no property rights, the local people have no incentive to take into 
account that their hunting today influences the wildlife stock and hence, reduces the potential 
for hunting next year. Technically, the stock size is then treated as an exogenous variable 
when allocating hunting effort, and is in line with the ‘open-access’ solution of Smith (1975). 
In the next step, when assuming that the property rights are handed over to the local people, 
they have incentives to invest in the wildlife stock, and take the stock size into account when 
hunting. Smith (1975) specifies this scenario within an inter-temporal framework where the 
present-value benefit is maximized. The present exposition where the local people consider 
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the wildlife stock as an endogenous variable under ecological equilibrium coincides with the 
steady-state of the Smith model when the discount rate is zero (see also Munro and Scott 
1985). 
 
The main point of the analysis is to find under what conditions community based management 
and property rights of the local people might result in a higher wildlife abundance compared 
to the no property rights scenario. It is shown that the actual outcome depends critically on 
the difference between the benefit and cost of living with wildlife; that is, the marginal 
harvesting value versus the marginal crop damage. Accordingly, only when the nuisance from 
the roaming wildlife is small and the marginal benefit exceeds the cost, we find that 
community based management increases the wildlife stock compared to the scenario of no 
property rights. The main message from the theoretical analysis is therefore that relying on 
local property rights alone as a tool in wildlife conservation may not work. This conclusion 
contrasts Kiss (1990) and Swanson and Barbier (1992) who argue that local property rights 
generally will promote wildlife conservation.  
 
The theoretical model is illustrated by data that represents the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem in a 
stylised manner. For the baseline parameter values the nuisance from the wildlife dominates 
the benefit, and hence, local property rights may give incentives to deplete the roaming stock 
of wildebeest. A better conservation strategy than handling the property rights over to the 
local people is probably to protect crop production by supporting fencing or take other types 
of control measures to reduce the damage caused by the roaming wildlife. The numerical 
simulations also demonstrate that an increased crop price or higher crop productivity through, 
say, improved fertiliser and pesticides use, may lead the local people to channel more effort 
towards agricultural production. Hence, such measures will also work in the direction of more 
wildlife conservation. This conclusion is in line with Barrett and Arcese (1998) who find that 
to succeed promoting wildebeest conservation in Serengeti, wildlife management schemes 
must attempt to increase local people’s benefit from alternative activities.  
 
The focus of the present analysis has been property rights and wildlife conservation. The 
basic idea behind giving the local people full property rights over the wildlife is, however, to 
promote wildlife conservation together with economic development and increased welfare 
(see, e.g., Kiss 1990). Ceteris paribus, the presence of property rights increases the welfare of 
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the local people compared to the scenario of no property rights as both effort and wildlife 
abundance are adjusted optimally within this regime, while only effort is adjusted within the 
no property rights regime.  When the damage of the roaming wildlife is small so that the 
benefit of living with wildlife exceeds the cost, we can therefore conclude that the presence of 
local property rights promotes wildlife conservation as well as local welfare. On the contrary, 
according to our numerical results, local welfare is promoted at the expense of wildlife 
conservation when the cost of living with wildlife exceeds the benefit. 
 
Throughout the analysis the local people has bee treated as a homogeneous group with no 
internal conflicting interests. From a conservation point of view, both property rights 
scenarios have thus been implemented in the most optimistically way. Under both scenarios, 
it is also assumed that the local people reap benefit from wildlife harvesting only; that is, 
possible income transfers from park activities and tourism is ignored in the analysis. 
Implementing such transfers will increase the benefit of living with wildlife, which may lead 
to more wildlife conservation in the local property rights regime. However, a complete 
analysis of income transfers requires a two-agent model, i.e. the park manager and the local 
people, and as demonstrated in Skonhoft (1998) such income transfers may impel unintended 
negative conservation effects.  
 
Acknowledgement 
We would like to thank Jan Tore Solstad and a reviewer for valuable comments and for 
funding from Norwegian Research Foundation, and The European Commission, through the 
program BIOECON. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Economists frequently confuse what is meant with property rights. Daniel Bromley understands property as a 
benefit stream and a property right as ‘the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one's claim to a 
benefit stream’ (Bromley 1991, p.15). Possession of inviolable property rights presupposes that the rights are 
authorised by law and that the law is effectively enforced by the state. Hence, a well-functioning property 
regime is characterised by, firstly, legally welldefined property rights and, secondly, effectively protected 
property rights. The existence or non-existence of these two factors defining the functioning of the property 
structure can be used to classify three different types of regimes. First of all we have the case where there is 
legally well-defined ownership and perfect state protection (exclusive rights, perfect law enforcement). This is in 
accordance with the classical Clark (1973) model. Secondly, we have the case where the ownership is legally 
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well defined but not adequately enforced by the government. Under such a scheme, often due to lack of societal 
recognition of the property rights in place, the management is likely to be affected by conflicting property rights 
claims. Finally, we have the case where there is no legally defined ownership; that is, the open-access case 
regime (Gordon 1954). Hence, the second of these regimes is the starting point in the following analysis.  
2 These schemes are polar because the local people obviously can obtain other rights than full property rights of 
the wildlife when being outside the park, say, through a specific harvesting quota, the rights to harvest problem 
animals, and so forth. Moreover, not analysed here, they can also obtain property rights of the wildlife when 
being inside the park through tourism benefits (cf. the concluding section). 
3 In reality, poaching takes place within as well as outside the borders of Serengeti National Park (see Sinclair 
and Arcese 1995). However, to simplify the theoretical framework, without altering the qualitative results, we 
assume that hunting is only taking place in the outer area.  
4 There are few, if any, papers analysing time discrete models with migration for terrestrial animal species within 
a bio-economic concept. Fancy et al. (1994) formulate a time discrete migration model for the porcupine caribou 
herd. The migration here is also seasonal, but this paper has no economic content.  
5 Introducing natural mortality makes the model quite more complicated, but it will not change the qualitative 
content of the analysis. 
6 As in Barrett and Arcese (1998) we use a single species (i.e., wildebeest), non age-specific (biomass) model. 
This also implies that the hunting is considered as non-selective, an assumption consistent with the largely 
passive nature of the main hunting method in the Serengeti area, namely snaring (see Campbell and Hofer 1995, 
Holmern et al. 2002).  
7 Combining equation (5) and equation (3) written as sXX 1t,1t,T +=+ = yields 
[ ] )X(G)X(FXsX t,Tt,Tt,T1t,T =+=+ . It is well known (see, e.g., Clark 1990, Ch.7) that the condition for 
stability is that 1'G1 <<−  holds at the equilibrium. We have [ ])K/rX2r(1s)'F1(s'G t,T−+=+=  which at 
the equilibrium reads [ ])r1(s/2s +−  when inserting for TX  (see the main text). Hence, stability demands 
0)r1(s/1 <+−  and 0)r1(s/3 >+− . The first of these conditions is therefore the same as the condition for 
obtaining an interior steady-state, while the second condition is fulfilled if 0a/X 0 <∂∂  holds (see the main 
text).  
8 It is therefore assumed that there are no conflicting interests among them. Hence, prevalence of individual 
conformity to group norms is assumed to be present. In line with traditional reasoning, it is assumed that the 
elders are in charge of the group’s activities (Marks 1984). This obviously means that the scenario of property 
rights to the local people in section 5 is implemented in its most optimistically way (cf. the concluding section).  
9 We assume that hunting is the only damage control performed by the local people (see below). In addition, and 
in reality, damage control is also performed through fencing and other measures more directly related to 
protecting the crop. In the model this would have worked through γ. As we are neglecting such measures, γ is 
assumed to be constant. 
10 As noticed above, the survival rate is equal to qaTes −= . Hence, C > 0 for all T > 0. 
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11 A shadow price is therefore now imposed on the wildlife. It can easily be shown that it is positive only as long 
as [PAγβ − PHqa] >0 holds; that is, the non-nuisance case (see the main text below). Accordingly, the shadow 
price is zero in the no property rights case. 
12 Harvesting is not strictly illegal in parts of the western side of the Serengeti National Park, and persons having 
a car and firearms can obtain a hunting licence (Rugumayo 1999). 
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Appendix 1 
Comparative static results 
The comparative static of the no property rights scenario is found by taking the total 
differential of (6) and (13). The result is   
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2
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2
0H <++−= γβ  from the second order maximum 
conditions while the sign of [ ] a/PqaPX)qaT1(saT)N(''AP)N('APG AH0AA γβ−−−−=  is 
ambiguous. The determinant of the system [ ][ ] rs/s/2r1a/CPqTsPKqTQ AH −+++ γβ  is 
also negative due to the second order conditions.  
 
The comparative static results when having property rights are found when taking the total 
differentiation of (14) and (6). Equations (A2)-(A4) give the stock effects where Z > 0 from 
the second order maximum condition.  
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Appendix 2  
The numerical analysis 
As mentioned in the main text, the ecological model is specified for the numerical analysis at 
the scale of one km2 and one year. The same scale is also used for the agricultural benefit, as 
well as the hunting benefit, given in 1998/99 prices. The protected area, consisting of 
Serengeti National Park and its surrounding game reserves, covers an area of some 26 000 
km2 (TANAPA Planning Unit 1996). The outer area is considered the catchment area 
surrounding the western edge of the protected area. Following Campbell and Hofer (1995), 
we assume that the catchment area, where the local people are originated, is located with a 
maximum distance of 45 km to the protected area. This area constitutes some 30 500 km2 
(Campbell and Hofer 1995). The human population in the outer area is estimated to be about 
1.1 million with an average household size of about 7 persons (Campbell and Hofer 1995). 
Accordingly, there will be about 5 households per km2 in the outer area. On average, 2 
persons per household work in agricultural production and hunting. Hence, the effort 
constraint L yields 10•365 days a year, and we have aTN +=3650 . 
 
 The wildebeest migration is related to rainfall and the wildebeest population enters 
agricultural land while it grazes the northern grassland during the dry season. The length of 
the dry season is about four months (Barrett and Arcese 1998). Four months, or 122 days, is 
also assumed to be the length of the migration period, and hence, T =122 days. The 
wildebeest population is estimated to be about 1.3 million animals and the annual offtake to 
some 120 000 animals (Campbell and Hofer 1995). The wildlife density during the period of 
migration is therefore about 43 animals per km2, while the total offtake is 4 animals per km2. 
The number of hunters per household in the western Serengeti is assumed to be about 0.2 
(Campbell and Hofer 1995). Consequently, it is one person involved in hunting at full time 
basis for every 5 households, and the baseline value of a is accordingly 1. By imposing these 
values for a and T into the survival rate together with 0X/H as 4/43, the catchability 
coefficient is calculated from equation (4). The result is q = 0.0008. Following Barrett and 
Arcese (1998), the hunting value of a wildebeest is about US$16, 16=HP . The natural growth 
function is specified as logistic. To calibrate the wildlife stock to its base level the carrying 
capacity K is set to 59 animals per km2 outer area, meaning that the ecosystem can carry a 
stock of wildebeest just below 1.8 million animals. The maximum specific growth rate is 
fixed as r = 0.3 (Caughley and Sinclar 1994).  
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The yield function is specified as αµN)N(A =  with µ as a productivity parameter and α as a 
scale parameter. The scale parameter is given as 0.8 (Barrett and Arcese 1998). According to 
a questionnaire among 300 households in Serengeti and Bunda Districts in June-September 
2001 (Anne Borge Johannesen, work in progress), the average plot size per household is 7.4 
acres, corresponding to a cultivated area of a fraction of 0.15 per km2 for the average 5 
households. For the same districts, the average value of the yield is estimated to be about 
US$19 000 per km2 cultivated land (Emerton and Mfunda 1999). At our scale of one km2, this 
represents a value of 19.000•0.15 = US$2 850 (or US$570 per household). The main crops 
grown in the Western Serengeti are sorghum, cassava, maize, and cotton (SRCP 1998). 
Personal communication (SRCP 1999) indicates a per kg price of US$ 0.18 for sorghum, US$ 
0.05 for cassava, US$ 0.11 for maize, and US$ 0.19 for cotton. By weighting the crop prices 
by the relative magnitude of these crops, we arrive at the price per kilo agricultural output 
equals US$ 0.15. AP  = 0.15. Consequently, for the specified yield function we have AP µNα 
=0.15•µ(3650 -1•122)0.8 =2 850, balancing with µ = 28.  
 
The wildebeest has a daily consumption of about 3% of their body weight in dry forage 
(Murray 1995), hence, β  = 0.03. When assuming an average weight of 150 kg per animal, the 
daily consumption of dry forage is therefore 4.5 kg per animal. To obtain a value for the 
fraction of the forage eaten from the crops γ, we use the first order condition (13). For the 
above estimated parameter values together with the imposed values for a and 0X , γ = 0.12 
balances this equation. Hence, through this calibrating we find that 12% of the wildebeests 
daily consumption of dry forage is from crops. Plugging into equation (8) this corresponds to 
a yearly damage on crop production of about 14%. This is the average of the estimates found 
in Emerton and Mfunda (1999) and Anne Borge Johannesen (work in progress).  Table A1 
summarises the baseline parameter values.  
 
 Table A1 about here 
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Figure 2: The seasonal ranges occupied by migratory wildebeest in the Serengeti-Mara        
 ecosystem (adopted from Murray 1995). 
 
Figure 1: Economic equilibrium. No property rights regime. 
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Figure3: The conservation-damage schedules. 
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Tables 
 
                      Table 1: Comparative static results 
  No property rights  Property rights  
Parameter ∞a  ∞0X  
*a  *X 0  
γ + - + - 
AP  - + -/+ +/- 
HP  + - +/- -/+ 
T ? ? ? ? 
L + - + - 
Q ? ? ? ? 
R + + ? ? 
K + + ? ? 
                          Note: When ‘+/-‘; a reduction in *a (-) is accompanied by a higher *X 0
* (+),  
                          and vice versa. When  ‘?’; ambiguous sign. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameter Description Value 
HP  Meat price  16 ($/animal) 
q Catchability coefficient  0.0008 (1/day) 
AP  Crop price  0.15 ($/kg) 
α Input elasticity labour crop production 0.8 
µ Productivity crop production 28 (kg/day) 
β Fraction daily consumption of dry forage  0.03 
γ Fraction dry forage consumption crop  0.12 
L Total available effort 3650 (day) 
T Length of migration period  122 (day) 
K Carrying capacity  59 (animal) 
r Intrinsic growth rate  0.3 
Table A1: Baseline values prices and costs (1998/99-prices), ecological     
parameters and other parameters 
